



Director of
Central
Intelligence

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National Intelligence Daily

**Thursday
14 August 1986**

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14 August 1986

Approved for Release
Date JUN 1999

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
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NICARAGUA:

Sandinista Military Adjustments

Temporary manpower shortages caused partly by the demobilization of experienced personnel are likely to hamper Sandinista ground operations, but

planned organizational changes should help offset the problem.

Some 2,200 combat veterans were released from service in recent weeks.

Draftees who are filling the gap left by those discharged have only limited training and overlap with their predecessors only briefly. previously exempt men are now being conscripted.

The new recruits' lack of training and experience will hurt the efficiency of counterinsurgency battalions at least in the short run. The regime probably believes it must release soldiers who have completed their two-year tours to avoid greater public resistance to the draft.

The Operations Group has long been plagued by coordination problems with the Air Force, and reorganization probably will give its commander greater control over ground, air, and logistic assets.

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HONDURAS:

Internal Military Tensions

A police raid on the home of a Honduran legislator last week reflects growing conflict within the military over the selection—due by January—of the next Army commander but is not likely to affect Honduran support for the anti-Sandinista rebels.

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The raid was carried out by the heads of military intelligence and the national police, both supporters of Colonel Riera, one of the primary candidates for the position of Army commander.

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Armed Forces Chief of Staff Regalado has temporarily suspended the intelligence and police chiefs

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The raid has backfired against Riera because of the public attention given the incident and the consequent embarrassment for the Armed Forces. Junior officers are mindful of the damage done to Honduras's prestige by the abrupt ousters of two previous Armed Forces chiefs and probably will insist on a solution guaranteeing military stability. President Azcona is likely to respect the military's institutional autonomy in selecting its own leadership, but continued controversy probably will be interpreted as an indication of the lack of civilian control.

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Despite claims in the press that the raid was related to conflicts over resupply of the anti-Sandinista insurgents, the action reflected an internal dispute and is unlikely to disrupt logistic support for the anti-Sandinistas.

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PAKISTAN: Government Cracks Down on Opposition

The Sind and Punjab provincial governments have banned all rallies scheduled for today, Pakistan's Independence Day, and arrested a number of opposition leaders.

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[redacted] at least 53 opposition leaders have been arrested throughout the two provinces. Benazir Bhutto, the most important government opponent, has been banned from traveling to Lahore to lead a planned demonstration. Some opposition elements, however, still plan to hold rallies today.

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[redacted] The crackdown is aimed at deterring violence as well as preventing a large opposition turnout that would embarrass Prime Minister Junejo and his government. Junejo had tried to gain the moral high ground by canceling a progovernment rally. Many Pakistanis feared bloodshed during today's scheduled demonstrations and are likely to be sympathetic to the ban on rallies. Outbreaks of violence today, however, are likely and will be met with firm police action. Bhutto and her followers will almost certainly try to organize more protests later this month.

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TURKEY: Foreign Minister's Tenure in Doubt

Foreign Minister Halefoglu is the Motherland Party candidate for the Ankara seat in parliamentary byelections on 28 September. Turkish officials told the press he is canceling his 10-12 September visit to the US because of the elections.

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[redacted] Halefoglu could remain as Foreign Minister while serving in Parliament. Although a cabinet reshuffle is expected after the byelections, his nomination for the Ankara seat, which virtually assures his victory, suggests he still enjoys Ozal's support. However, the press made much of Ozal's failure to meet Soviet leader Gorbachev during his recent visit to Moscow, and Ozal may hold his Foreign Minister responsible.

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
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BURKINA-LIBYA: Closer Ties

Libya recently donated four SF-260 light tactical support aircraft to Burkina and is providing Ouagadougou with cement to complete an airfield near Po, an isolated town in southern Burkina.

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possible Libyan-sponsored training for dissidents from the Ivory Coast at the military base in Po, where a small number of Libyan advisers are garrisoned.

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President Sankara's desire to rearm his ill-equipped military, defeated by neighboring Mali in a border dispute last December, will provide opportunities for further Libyan involvement in the region. Burkina lacks qualified pilots and will continue to rely on Libya, which provided pilots during the conflict with Mali. In exchange, Burkina may allow Libya to use the camp at Po to train regional dissidents and to build the airfield to facilitate Libyan activities elsewhere in West Africa.

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BRAZIL: Wavering on GATT Services Question

The Brazilian Government is concerned that its opposition to including services as a topic at the GATT ministerial meeting next month might jeopardize its influence in future GATT proceedings on this issue.

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Brasilia probably is concerned about the flexibility other headline countries are showing toward services negotiations as the ministerial meeting approaches, and it may try to seek an early compromise on services, either informally or at the meeting on 29 August of the Services Group [REDACTED] b3

UN: Resolution on Puerto Rico

The Special Committee on Decolonization—Committee of 24—will vote today on its annual agenda item dealing with Puerto Rico. A Venezuelan-sponsored resolution challenges Puerto Rico's status as a commonwealth freely associated with the US. As in previous years, the Committee heard petitioners to this agenda item, most of whom advocated independence for Puerto Rico and attacked the US. Sweden is the only Western nation on the Committee of 24. [REDACTED] b3

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The resolution is likely to pass by a margin similar to that of last year's almost identical resolution—11 for; 1 against; 12 absent or abstaining. There is a small chance that this resolution may pass without opposition because Chile may decide to abstain, for the first time on this matter, to protest US criticism of its human rights record. Although the resolution is sponsored by Venezuela, the bulk of the votes in favor of it are likely to be from Iran, Cuba, Libya, and the Eastern Bloc countries. [REDACTED] b3

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
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Terrorist Watch

Middle East




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— Suspected members of the ~~Lebanese~~ Armed Revolutionary Faction—using the name of Anti-Imperialism International Brigades—bombed two French banks in Beirut Sunday. The terrorists are demanding that France release Arab, Armenian, and French prisoners. They threatened more attacks against Italy unless two LARF members there are freed. LARF's demand that French prisoners be released may indicate it has renewed contacts with French terrorists.

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
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In Brief

Middle East

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USSR

Gorbachev intended to announce extension of nuclear test moratorium that day ... said delay caused by unspecified "last-minute changes" but announcement to occur soon ... cited Moscow's desire to respond to Group of Six appeal and to recent US Congressional actions

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Americas

- Discontent in Cuban capital noted [redacted] during carnival last month ... five persons, including local party official, allegedly killed by police ... reflects growing disenchantment with economic policies.

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- Peru recalled Ambassador over East Germany's failure to provide information on illicit arms shipment ... [redacted] move to soften press criticism about shipment, anti-Western image of debt stance.

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Africa

- Madagascar devalued currency by 25 percent this week ... other reforms planned ... hopes wage increase for civil servants, donor assistance will preempt urban protest over rise in cost of living.

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
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
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Special Analysis



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Special Analysis

SOUTH AFRICA:

Black Antigovernment Organizations

Pretoria's detention of thousands of antigovernment activists, curfews in black townships, and bans on meetings and publications of dozens of black groups have halted the momentum of nationwide protests and complicated efforts by black activists to build local political organizations. The government has the resources to keep black groups off balance for some time, but eventually its tactics are likely to fuel protests further and to strengthen grassroots antigovernment organizations.

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Black politics of the last two years have been marked by a proliferation of community-based groups and more recently by recognition by the major antiparthoid alliance, the United Democratic Front, that future political gains depend largely on its ability to broaden its support at the local level.

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before the declaration of the state of emergency in June, as many as half of urban blacks were living in areas where "alternative structures"—some kind of black organizations—exercised at least some influence.

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the government had "lost" several areas to UDF groups. Pretoria believed last month that "alternative structures" were exercising considerable control in several areas of Cape Province.

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Emerging black community organizations include teachers' groups, civic associations, youth congresses, women's and church groups, and various "action" committees. In some cases these groups have attempted to provide services previously offered by government-backed local authorities; in others they have focused more narrowly on specific issues and on political organization.

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Pretoria's Countermoves

Since declaring the state of emergency, Pretoria has tried to curb many of these UDF-affiliated groups by prohibiting their activities and arresting large numbers of low-level and midlevel leaders. A recent study by a university research group indicates officials or members of some 140 community groups have been detained; over two-thirds of some 4,000 identified detainees are linked to the UDF.

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Nevertheless, various reporting indicates some local organizations were able to regroup within weeks of the declaration of the state of emergency and many activists continue to move in and out of townships undetected.

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Community-Based Black Politics

The influence and effectiveness of township civic and youth organizations vary widely. In general, however, these groups have sought to discredit local black officials and government structures and to harness the deepening discontent in black urban areas. Numerous black officials have been killed and others intimidated into resigning. In other situations, local groups have built support by focusing on issues such as education.

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In addition, community organizations have been in the forefront of organizing boycotts. For example, local black leaders—some elected and some self-appointed—have staged rent boycotts to exploit the hardship imposed on blacks by rising unemployment and inflation. Press reporting indicates that some 30 rent boycotts are under way. Several townships also have organized boycotts of white-owned shops and schools and sparked intermittent strikes.

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Outlook

Pretoria will not hesitate to impose harsher measures to cripple either national or local organizations that it views as politically threatening. It probably will not succeed in halting the growing politicization of township blacks or in creating a political climate that will allow it to install credible, but compliant, black leaders.

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Moreover, grassroots organizations based on oral communication, local leadership, and regular contact with the community are likely to prove more resilient in the face of crackdowns than larger, more diverse black organizations. As in the past, arrests of black activists are likely to lead to the emergence of more militant leaders from black groups.

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There are no prospects for quick stabilization in the volatile black townships. Although community groups could help reduce violence in some townships if black leaders are able to rein in militant youth, these same groups will remain adamantly opposed to Pretoria's plans for moderate and gradual reform.

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In some cases, black-against-black violence may increase as local groups that use young militants to enforce discipline and to intimidate opponents square off against armed supporters of government-backed officials. Town councillors in Soweto, for example, voted last week to form vigilante groups in their districts to protect residents wishing to pay rent.

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
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
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